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LIVESTOCK MARKETS AND RISK MANAGEMENT
AMONG EAST AFRICAN PASTORALISTS:
A REVIEW AND RESEARCH AGENDA
DeeVon Bailey, Christopher B. Barrett, Peter D. Little, and Francis Chabari

ABSTRACT

1

LIVESTOCK MARKETS AND RISK MANAGEMENT
AMONG EAST AFRICAN PASTORALISTS:
A REVIEW AND RESEARCH AGENDA2

Introduction

The purpose of our Global Livestock CRSP project is to identify risk reducing alternatives
for East African pastoralists. Many believe the level of risk faced by pastoralists is excessive and
may even be increasing. Among the many candidate explanations for high and rising risk exposure
are (i) limited and declining spatial refugia as population pressures, violence, and the gazetting of
protected areas for environmental conservation have limited access to dry season grazing areas, (ii)
substantial and seemingly increasing climatic variability, (iii) inadequate physical and institutional
infrastructure to support asset or income diversification, (iv) and increased political instability in the
region coupled with economic liberalization that has brought macroeconomic shocks and greater
market price variability. Our own participatory risk mapping work finds that pastoralists themselves
consider the condition of livestock markets, and especially the prices they receive in such markets,
a major source of risk they face (Smith et al. 1999). An important intermediate objective of this
proj ect is therefore to describe accurately market conditions confronting pastoralists in the region
and to identify market interventions or reforms that might reduce the market-related risks they face.
Our study area traverses an ecologically, ethnically and institutionally heterogeneous transect
of approximately 750 kilometers, from Agere Mariam in southern Ethiopia south through Baringo,

2We thank Abdillahi Aboud, Layne Coppock, Solomon Desta, Simeon Ehui, Ahmed Mahmud, Stephen
Sandford, and Kevin Smith for helpful discussions on this topic and Hussein Mahmoud and Sheila Nkonge for valuable
research assistance. All remaining errors are ours alone.
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Isiolo, and Samburu Districts in northern Kenya. Although some animals from southern Ethiopia-especially north ofYabello in the study region--flow northward to Addis Ababa and sometimes on
to export markets in the Arabian peninsula, Nairobi acts as the principal terminal market for
livestock in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia -

and more generally for livestock from

throughout Kenya, southern Somalia, northern Tanzania, even eastern Uganda.

Cross-border

livestock trade is substantial and seems to be growing rapidly in the Greater Hom of Africa (Little
1996). Moyale, on the Ethiopia-Kenya border, is a major catchment market for southern Ethiopia,
and for small stock from Moyale District, Kenya. The main livestock movement corridor in our
study area follows the dirt road from Moyale through Marsabit and Isiolo, where it becomes tarmac
and proceeds southward to Nairobi.3 While some livestock are sold, slaughtered, and consumed in
market towns along the transect, most are eventually sold in Nairobi, drawn by its metropolitan
population and purchasing power. 4
The purposes of this background paper are to (1) provide an overview of the state of the
livestock marketing channel in the study area, based mainly on secondary data, (2) examine the
relevant literature dealing with risk in livestock markets in sub-Saharan Africa, (3) and determine
critical livestock marketing research needs in our study area of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya
and (4) introduce a conceptual framework that we think can usefully guide further empirical
research. We also examine methodologies that could be used to evaluate the market risks faced by

3Livestock from the southwestern reaches of our study area, in Baringo and southwestern Samburu Districts,
sometimes move through Laikipia or [Nakuru] and [down country toward highland markets and on to NairobL]
4The Nairobi meat market is the main outlet for slaughter cattle and smallstock. Numerous slaughter houses
exist within and around Nairobi. A small meat market for camels has also developed and caters mostly to the growing
number of Somali refugees coming to Nairobi. The estimates for daily camel slaughter is small (only about 30 head).
The camels are mainly slaughtered at Athi River and the carcasses transported to Nairobi.
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pastoralists. This information will be used to determine what data and methodologies will be used
in the livestock-marketing portion of the project.
In any review of the literature on livestock markets in semi-arid tropical Africa (SATA), it
becomes immediately apparent that far more work has been completed dealing with livestock
markets in West Africa than in East Africa. However, the conditions of pastoralists and livestock
markets in both regions of Africa appear to be similar in important respects and the literature dealing
with west African livestock markets is relevant to East Africa both in terms of the issues addressed
and the methodologies used in the more recent literature. The literature cited in this paper is not
exhaustive, but rather includes those pieces we consider most relevant to the present CRSP project
in East Africa.
As the structure of this paper reveals, we think it useful to distinguish (i) analysis of market
participants and their behavior, including aggregate manifestations of behavior as revealed in price
and volume data, from (ii) analysis of the environmental, infrastructural, and institutional context
in which market participants make marketing decisions. A primary reason we deem this distinction
useful is that governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can generally affect only
participants' decision-making context, i.e., the incentives and constraints they face. Examining this
context as a whole facilitates comparisons to identify where interventions will likely prove most
effective. Based on our examination of the literature, our recommendation is that the livestockmarketing component of this proj ect proceed in two stages. First, we should pursue a similar
approach to the most recent literature evaluating livestock markets in West Africa using
methodologies not yet applied to livestock markets in East Africa (e.g., investigating spatial market
integration in the study area). This will require market data on both the Ethiopian and Kenyan sides
of the border. Second, we should then address the behavioral and contextual questions largely absent
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from the existing literature on livestock marketing in SATA (e.g., the effects of quarantineS on
livestock price distributions and herder welfare, or allocation of the price risk faced by pastoralists'
by source, since the appropriate remedy is conditional on the root cause of price risk) and approach
longstanding questions (e.g., pastoralists' price elasticity of livestock supply, the structure of the
livestock marketing channel) using analytical methods heretofore absent from the literature on
livestock marketing in SATA.

State of the Regional Livestock Industry: The Market Participants
The livestock marketing system is made up of pastoralists who raise animals, traders who
buy animals in and around periodic markets throughout the rangelands, hoping to sell them at a
profit elsewhere, transporters, local butchers, terminal market abattoirs in and around Nairobi, meat
wholesalers, and, ultimately, consumers. A detailed outline of marketing channels in the Kenyan
/

part of the study area for different species is provided by Njiru (1983), and secondarily by the reports
of the Government of Kenya! GTZ Range Management Handbooks for the region (for example see
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development, and Marketing 1993).6 Because we were unable
to spend sufficient amounts of time in southern Ethiopia and generally found scant secondary data
or reports on the Ethiopian livestock industry pertinent to our study area (important exceptions are
Fekade 1994; Mariam 1993; and Edwards and Mesfin (1996)), most of this section focuses on the
Kenya side of the border. This highlights one area in need of research-basic descriptive analysis
of the southern Ethiopian livestock industry is presently lacking. Some of this gap hopefully will

5Quarantines are an issue for livestock moving towards Nairobi but are not an issue for livestock moving from
southern Ethiopia to Addis Ababa (Mahmud (1999)).
6Little (1996) provides a good, parallel treatment of the competing marketing channel from southern Somalia
through Garissa and on to Nairobi. The basic organization of the marketing channel is the same across these distinct
corridors.
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be filled by the current OSSREA (Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern
Africa)IBASIS study of cross-border trade, which is collecting livestock marketing data on the
Ethiopian side (see Little et al. 1998).

Pas tora lis ts
The foundation of the livestock industry in the study area is the pastoral herders who live on
products provided by their livestock (e.g., milk, blood, and meat) and sell livestock when cash is
needed or when necessitated by climatic conditions. 7 Pastoralists hold animals for a multitude of
reasons. Livestock are a form of productive capital, providing a stream of desired goods and
services, including milk (the primary good for most pastoralists in our study region), blood, manure,
transport, and traction. They also serve as an important store of wealth and insurance, functions that
are extremely important in the absence of well-developed rural financial markets and given
J

significant covariate risk due to climate, civil unrest, and epidemiological shocks. Sometimes this
wealth is consumed directly through slaughtering and meat consumption, but more often livestock
are sold and the proceeds used to purchase grain, pay school fees, etc. The modem economics
literature generally understands this as consumption smoothing (Binswanger and McIntire 1987,
Swinton 1988, Bromley and Chavas 1989, Fafchamps et al. 1997). The importance of animals as
stores of wealth is also reflected in social institutions surrounding marriage and inheritance, in which
livestock play prominent roles. Indeed, the largest single allocation of livestock that a male herder
is likely to make in a lifetime is for bridewealth at marriage, which exceeds 15 cattle and numerous
small stock in parts of the study region. This points toward the considerable sociocultural functions,

7We should point out that our discussion of livestock marketing will focus almost exclusively on the meat
industry, ignoring issues specific to the dairy industry. The reason is that pastoralists in our study region rarely sell
productive dairy cattle and the breeds they keep are not especially well-suited to peri-urban dairying, so almost all sales
are destined for slaughterhouses. East African dairying is studied in detail by, among others Ehui, Delgado, Nicholson
et al.
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beyond the purely material uses, of livestock in the study region, although some of these institutions
are changing. For example, in parts ofBaringo District, Kenya marriage payments in the form of
cash are partially substituting for livestock payments. Nonetheless, livestock are a source of
prestige, a means for extending and investing in complex networks of social obligations and
reciprocity that mitigate risk, and a part of rites of passage to adulthood.
The orientation of pastoral herders to keep livestock as their main source offood (milk) has
important implications for herd structures in the region and, consequently, for strategies to increase
market off-take rates. Unlike commercial beefherds in the USA, pastoral cattle herd structures are
strongly biased toward female animals, especially mature milk animals (cows) rather than beef
animals (steers and bulls). This bias in herd structure can facilitate relatively rapid animal recovery
after drought- or disease-induced 'shocks' to the herd. Little shows in the Baringo part of the study
/

region that typical herd structures include more than 60 percent female animals (not including calves
up to 1 year old), and only 4 percent bulls, 10 percent immature bulls (over 1 year old), and 7 percent
steer (Little 1985:149). Data from elsewhere in the study region generally supports this pattern,
although the bias in female animals is even higher among the Rendille of Marsabit District, Kenya.
For example, in this area the IP AL project found that female camels constituted 72.4 percent of the
adult herd, while the percentages for adult cattle, sheep, and goat herds and flocks are, respectively,
79.6,77, and 77.5 percent (IPAL 1984). In short, pastoral herds in the study region are structured
to provide supplies of milk, high rates of reproduction, and rapid herd recovery following disasters;
annual herd off-take rates that exceed 8 or 9 percent can compromise these functions (It is unknown
how much herd structures in the region have changed in the past 10 years as the result of increased
commercialization). The implications of these kinds of herd and flock structures is that the available
supply of beef animals is far less than most development planners acknowledge. These are the
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animals that traders and urban consumers most desire and which herders are most willing to sell,
although they possess fewer of them. The willingness of herders to dispose of productive female
animals, the largest proportion of the herd, is usually a sign of extreme economic and social stress.
The supply response of livestock producers is a critical component of any study of livestock markets
in SAT A since orderly marketing depends on a predictable response by buyers and sellers to
different economic conditions. That livestock serve multiple purposes-some of which conflict with
maximal herd off-take strategies-complicates pastoral marketing behavior. In addition, since
different members (e.g., husbands and wives) of the household may have different disposal and use
rights to the herd, intra-household relations and tensions can constrain sales of what might be
interpreted as 'surplus' animals. The multiple and, in some cases, overlapping rights of different
household members to the family herd is well recognized (see Ensminger 1992; Hutchinson 1996),
but virtually no empirical attempt has been made to assess its impact on pastoral marketing patterns.
Negotiations take place between husbands and wives (ana, in some cases, sons) regarding the sale
of family livestock--especially when a wife(s) has economic rights to the animal--but the outcome
of these on off-take rates and marketing decisions is poorly understood. The project anticipates
addressing this issue through its household surveys and ethnographic inquiries.
Sandford (p. 202 (1983)) suggests there is no " ... universal proposition about the supply
response of pastoralists to changes in the prices of their outputs." Sandford (1983) also attempted
to rationalize the motivations of pastoralists in their livestock marketing decisions by reasoning that
in an economy, such as SATA, where few goods are available for purchase that livestock are sold
mainly to meet obligations that require cash such as for schooling or taxes, but that permanent
changes in prices should generate an expected (though modest) supply response. Pastoralists' supply
responsiveness hinges on the multiple motivations pastoralists have for either holding or selling
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livestock.

It also should be remembered that pastoralists also frequently use the market to

repurchase animals for their own herds, often selling when prices are favorable and repurchasing
when they are low. The greater the role of social considerations in stocking decisions with few
viable investment and asset options for herders, the lesser the expected price or income elasticity of
supply (Ministry of Planning and National Development; and Coppock (1994)). Conversely, the
greater the wealth store and insurance motives for holding livestock and the greater the asset and
investment options for herders, the greater the expected response of pastoralists to price and other
market shocks (Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado (1988); and Reardon, Delgado, and Matlon (1992)).
And the greater the importance of the stream of benefits (milk, etc.) produced by animals, the more
responsive will supply be to changes in animal productivity and the livestock/grain terms of trade.
Fafchamps and Gavian (1997) demonstrate that livestock markets in SATA are responsive
/

to large demand shocks but they also demonstrate that livestock markets in West SATA are poorly
integrated. However, the supply response to income shocks is less clear and may counter to some
degree that livestock are held as a form of self insurance in some parts of SATA. For example,
Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1996) reported that livestock sales were much smaller than
anticipated in Burkina Faso during periods of drought. They speculated that poorly integrated
livestock markets may account for why livestock may not be a desirable hedge against income
shocks in SATA.
Fafchamps (1998) concludes that there are two reasons why producers hold onto livestock
in SATA even when their animals may die during periods of drought. First, producers " ... desire
to smooth consumption when livestock make an essential contribution to household income and
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other assets are not available."s Second, that producers may be hoping to realize higher prices for
their livestock when livestock supplies are diminished (i.e., producers realize that the demand for
livestock is inelastic). Fafchamps(l998) argues further that the relative strength of these two forces
depends on how inelastic the demand for livestock is and also the degree of market segmentation
(integration).
So, the multiple roles played by livestock necessarily complicates understanding of
pastoralist behavior. While the prevailing wisdom is that the price elasticity of livestock supply is
quite low owing to the multifaceted use of animals by pastoralists, the apparently limited price
responsiveness of pastoralists may result from animals' multiple roles in response to the multiple
institutional, infrastructural, and environmental obstacles they face. Whether the increasing
monetization of pastoral economies and recent or prospective changes in complementary systems
J

(e.g., rural finance, resource tenure) will lead to fundamental changes in pastoralist livestock
marketing patterns remains an untested hypothesis, and one on which we envision this project
working.
Much of the past literature has suggested that the issues of supply response, and consequently
prices and market risk, can not be separated from the effect of rainfall and social and economic
reasons for large herds of livestock. Sandford (1982), for example, shows that over a drought-todrought cycle (approximately 5-7 years in most parts of our study region) the costs of
'understocking,' in terms of losses in herd productivity and benefits, in good years to approximate
a constant stocking rate exceeds the economic losses from drought-induced herd crashes. This
pattern, of course, will vary according to local ecological, economic, and other variables, but it does

8Fafchamps (1998) argues this is especially true for pastoralists whose income is mostly from livestock an who
are unable to accumulate grain because of their nomadic lifestyle.
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partly explain why pastoralists are reluctant to de-stock through market sales during non-drought
years. While researchers have continued to acknowledge the central role of drought in pastoral herd
management decisions, they have also addressed more fully other economic reasons why pastoralists
continue to hold livestock as their principal form of wealth. For example, Coppock's comprehensive
1994 study of the Borana Plateau in southern Ethiopia suggests that while significant cultural and
structural barriers exist, banking offers additional alternatives for pastoralists for diversifying their
wealth and, hence, reducing the income risk they face. Coppock (p 257, (1994)) also suggests that
"Research into risk management of animal assets may be very timely for systems under increased
population pressure." More recently, Fafchamps (1998) contended that unless herders " ... have
access to alternative savings instruments so that they can liquidate livestock if they fear losing
animals ... they will tend to cling onto their assets as - highly imperfect -- forms of self-insurance.
J

Consequently, making alternative investments available to pastoralists appears to be an important
component of any strategy designed to decrease their risk and research is needed to determine which
non-livestock investments will be acceptable and successful forpastoralists. Iflivestock become less
important as a means of self insurance, then reducing the market risks faced by pastoralists should
increase offtake, thereby lowering stocking rates to levels that may reduce widespread losses during
droughts and, thus, stabilizing livestock throughput volumes, enhancing incentives to invest in meat
processing capacity.
Marketing patterns are crucial to pastoralist welfare for a simple reason. In the difficult
natural environment of our study area, climatic and disease risk lead to relatively high mortality rates
if pastoralists are unable to sell off animals preemptively. For example, new data from southern
Ethiopia using household herd history recall information show that from 1980-97, mortality on
average accounts for more than seven times the gross reductions in herd sizes accounted for by sales
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(Desta, personal communication).9 Figure 1 shows that even in good years, mortality always
dominates marketing as the regulator of herd sizes. While stocking rates necessarily vary with
climatic and ecological conditions, the fact that mortality rather than marketed offtake serves as the
primary adjustment mechanism reflects enormous loss of wealth in the system. A central aim of this
project is to find ways to empower pastoralists to convert a significant portion of gross herd
reductions from deaths into sales, and thereby capture considerable lost wealth with which to ensure
food security, invest in health and education, and enable human development and conservation of
valuable rangeland ecosystems.

Traders
As a social and economic category, livestock traders encompass a multitude of different
actors, from small-scale 'bush' traders to market brokers to large urban-based merchants with
transport and considerable capital (see Little 1992). At the lowest levels in the market chain traders
purchase animals from pastoralists up country and sell them, directly or indirectly through colleagues
or secondary buyers, to processors in and around Nairobi and other terminal markets. Their business
is arbitrage, trying to earn profits by buying at low prices in areas and times of excess supply and
selling at higher prices in places and times of excess demand. A cohort of competitive arbitrageurs
is essential to efficient marketing arrangements. Traders are the vehicles by which price signals in
one market are transmitted to another, thereby propagating information on location-specific (demand
or supply) shocks throughout the broader region. Arbitrageurs' costs relate primarily to transport,
storage, information, finance and risk. As these costs escalate, trader activity falls, leading to greater

9This does not suggest that economic losses from drought are larger than gains resulting from "normal" offtake
since animals which die during drought periods could have been sold only at unusually low prices. This is illustrative,
however, of the potential opportunity costs associated with boom and bust cycles in the study area.
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spatial and intertemporal price disparities and greater chance for the exercise of market power by one
or a small number of traders.
In the large urban markets, such as those in Nairobi, market brokers (often called dilaal)
operate to match urban-based buyers, such as butchers and processors, with sellers who may be
transporting animals from the range areas. The broker charges a fee to the seller of as much as 3
percent of the animal's market value, in order to match him/her with a buyer. The broker may also
charge a fee to the buyer. This practice reduces market uncertainties for both the seller and buyer.
The principle of trust is important in such relations. Boran traders from northern Kenya, for
example, often use Boran brokers in Njeru market, Nairobi, since they feel they can rely on them to
find the best prices for them (Little found in 1996 that Boran traders had placed a Boran broker in
Njeru market to help them negotiate fair market prices). Somali traders often do the same. In the
j

Dagoretti market of Nairobi, where auctions take place and Kikuyu, Kamba, and Maasai buyers are
dominant, up-country traders often feel they still not receive fair prices and claim there is market
collusion among groups of buyers even at auctions. Many Northern Kenyan traders and herders
prefer to use Nj eru market to Dagoretti, because their market contacts are better there.
Despite their centrality to efficient market operations, traders are commonly scorned by
producers, including pastoralists in our study region, and scholars (e. g. Swift(l979)) as exploitative.
This is particularly so when traders are from minority ethnic groups (e.g., Burji or Somali traders
in Marsabit District) and are seen as 'outsiders' who capitalize on the market disadvantages of local
herders. For example, in 1999 increased tensions have been directed at traders of certain ethnic
groups who operate in Marsabit and Moyale Districts, Kenya (Kevin Smith, personal
communication). Ethnic traders often are used as 'scapegoats' when there is an economic downturn.
Where the institutional or infrastructural context-e.g., an absence of open auctions, poor roads that
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impede trader traffic, etc.-forces pastoralist sellers to confront a single, monopsonistic buyer (or
a small number of potentially collusive buyers), traders may indeed "exploit" pastoralists, in the
sense of offering them a price that leaves a significant, positive economic profit for the trader. In
some cases, however, the low price offered by the trader may be a function of the extremely high
transport costs in the area; in some cases, it may be the transporters who are reaping the greatest
economic benefits, since many traders do not own their own lorries and must hire transport. But
where institutions and infrastructure render livestock trading and transport competitive, marginal
profits in trading quickly go to zero, with only the most efficient and agile traders earning
sustainable profits. There appears to be little evidence that traders are on average able to capture
"abnormally high" returns (Staatz (1979); Holtzman, Stattz, and Weber (1980); Herman (1983);
Holtzman and Kulibaba (1994); Holtzman, Kulibaba, and Stathacos (1992)). Sandford (p. 206
j

(1983)) reports that livestock marketing margins appear consistent across countries and " ... that
there are [no] startling improvements to be gained in raising returns to producers ... by reorganizing
or regulating the marketing chain between the producer and the point at which sales of live animals
are made to butchers or slaughter houses." In the same spirit, Staal and Shapiro (1994) conclude that
price liberalization in Kenyan dairy markets improved producer profits because the marketing
channel is workably competitive. Holzman and Kulibaba (1994) suggest that while traders may have
a "competitive edge" resulting from superior market information, this advantage can best be
eliminated through enhancing competition and maintaining marketing infrastructure and information
systems. For example, eliminating barriers to credit access that impede entry into trading and
improving the quality of publicly available livestock market information could reduce this
advantage.

14
While traders may have some competitive advantage compared to typical pastoralists, they
still face considerable risk. For example, In the Nairobi market northern Kenyan livestock often
compete with animals coming in from Tanzania and Somalia. The flow of animals from these crossborder markets depend on a range of factors (border closures, drought and market conditions in these
countries, etc) that are difficult to predict and can change rapidly. This increases the risk faced by
the up-country trader who may arrive in Nairobi with cattle purchased in northern Kenya only to find
thousands of animals have arrived from another country.
Casual observation suggests that many of the most successful traders have been able to
procure lorries, and thereby overcome regular transport bottlenecks, have access to considerable cash
savings and lines of credit with which to finance purchases, and have strong informational and
distribution networks-both up country and in Nairobi-often through ethnic (especially Somali)
j

and clan ties. Given considerable mobility barriers within low-income agricultural marketing
channels, the emergence ofhighly profitable pockets within the marketing channel is commonplace,
especially in bulk, long-distance trading (Barrett 1997).
Under current conditions of poor market information, infrastructure, insecurity, and
unfavorable market access by herders, ethnicity tends to assume an important role in market
transactions.

Since formal market contracts and formal credit are rarely used, trust assumes

considerable importance in market transactions. To minimize transaction costs associated with
acquiring market information, market fraud and enforcement, and weak credit markets, traders and
herders often deal with market actors from their own or closely related ethnic groups. This pattern
tends to become even more important as political insecurity accelerates, a pattern that Peter Little
has observed in northeastern Kenya and southern Somalia (Little 1996) The importance of ethnicity
also seems especially important in long-distance livestock trade (see Cohen 1965).

15

Processors
Slaughter and meat handling and distribution facilities are a critical link between the
livestock trader and the final consumer. Orderly markets depend on these facilities to efficiently
move products through the final stages of the marketing channel. If demand and supply do not
match in the channel, wide swings in price can take place. 1o Even if livestock supply from
pastoralists and meat demand from final consumers are reasonably price elastic, capacity constraints
in the marketing channel can create inelasticities of meat supply and animal demand that result in
dramatic price fluctuations even in the presence of perfect competition. As a consequence,
matching slaughter and distribution capacity with the demand and supply of meat is a fundamental
task of any livestock marketing system.

This matching can be done effectively only if

communications and transport infrastructure enable good market information availability and
responsive movement of animals and complementary products across space and time, 11 and if supply
and demand are reasonably predictable much of the time (e.g., not prone to severe disruption due to
civil strife or disease epidemics).
Moreover, the large capital outlays required to build and maintain processing and distribution
systems involve significant, unrecoverable ("sunk") costs and result in increasing returns to scale
in distribution and processing over a fair range of quantities. Highly variable and often low
throughput volumes can thereby discourage private investment in processing and distribution
capacity, resulting in bottlenecks in the marketing system that lead to greater price variability. A

l OAn example is the recent glut of hogs in U. S. markets which have outstripped the ability of slaughter facilities
to effectively handle them. As a result, hog prices recently dropped to their lowest absolute level of the past 40 years
(about $0.20/kg.).

IIFor example, knowledge regarding livestock inventories, relative prices, and the number oflivestock expected
to move to market in the·near and longer terms are essential for planning purposes.

16
vicious cycle often erupts under such circumstances, whereby volatile market conditions discourage
both pastoralist livestock producers and prospective entrants into meat distribution and processing,
thereby rendering market conditions still more volatile.

J
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Status a/the Kenyan Meat Industry
The state-owned Kenya Meat Commission (KMC)12 was established in 1960 and operated
slaughter and canning facilities up to 1987. The Athi River plant closed in 1987, reopened in 1989
and closed again in 1993. KMC, a legal monopoly and monopsony in Kenya's livestock industry,
administratively set livestock and meat prices. It incurred substantial operating losses and was often
significantly in arrears in payments to livestock suppliers. As with many SATA food marketing
parastatals, KMC kept prices low to appease a vocal, urban constituency, at considerable cost to
livestock producers in pastoral areas. The legacy of administrative livestock pricing led to under
investment by private traders in transport and processing capital necessary to maintain or expand
capacity in the sector, and the collapse of much of the modem ranching industry in Kenya (Mbogoh
1997, Mutea and Lelei 1994). For example, Little (1992) posits that policies as far back as the
J

colonial period which discouraged mobile traders and encouraged trading at administrative posts
developed a local dependence on large market towns outside of local districts. Coupled with growing
insecurity in the north, the number of livestock traders appears to have fallen sharply, at least until
meat and livestock price deregulation in 1987. The legacy of that era nonetheless persists in the
form of weak supporting infrastructure, limited private distribution and processing capacity, and
widespread claims of local trader monopsony in animal purchasing (Mbogoh 1997).

12At one time the Ethiopians had a paarastatal Ethiopian Livestock and Meat Corporation (ELIMCO) that was
a less prominent entity than KMC was in Kenya. While ILIMCO purchased animals at administratively-determined
prices which were adjusted roughly every three months, it never had either official or de facto monopsony power.
Consequently, it did not eliminate investments by private traders as much as was the case in Kenya with the KMC.
ELIMCO would generally buy from the southern and eastern parts of Ethiopia primarily for export. It owned large
holding areas all of which were sold to private parties in the early 1990s. ELIMCO itself was closed in 1994 (Mahmud
(1999)).
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A three-volume feasibility study was completed for the KMC in 1989 by a firm based in the
United Kingdom (Union International Consultants (1989)).13

The report recommended a

restructuring of the KMC into a new commercially-oriented entity called the Kenya National Meat
Corporation (KNMC) with a high proportion of the corporation being sold to private shareholders
during the fourth year of the KNMC 's operation. The report recommended upgrading the existing
facilities at the KMC rather than constructing new facilities and also suggested getting the Athi River
plant back into operation slaughtering animals and canning meat for the domestic and export markets
as soon as possible. The consultants also suggested operating the Mombasa slaughter facility and
the Nairobi and Mombasa distribution depots to supply the domestic market while maintaining the
livestock holding grounds at both Mombasa and Nairobi abattoirs to help maintain needed supplies.
The report predicted that KNMC would be profitable by the third year earning a profit of 7% of
J

gross sales. The KMC facilities at Athi River (near Nairobi) and Mombasa remain closed although
the Athi River facilities were fully reconditioned by the Mitsubishi Company. In late 1998, KMC
was put into receivership and its future remains unclear even though private companies/associations
are offering to buy the facilities.
Another, more recent study (undated but containing 1994 statistics l4) contains an outline of
current meat sub-sector problems and proposed future development alternative and policies. The
report predicted a meat deficit of 130,000 metric tons in Kenya by 1995 that could only be met by
imports. This and other such predictions have failed to materialize-in fact, meat prices in Nairobi
have been relatively stable during 1995-1998--suggesting that available national statistics are not

13Yolume 1 ofthe study presented an overall strategy and business plan for KMC, volume 2 examined the cattle
and beef sectors, and volume 3 contained appendices.
14"Meat Sub-Sector Review" in Kenyan GovernmentIDonors Agricultural Sector Review.
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reliable. Among other reasons, government estimates have difficulty accounting for the considerable
unofficial imports that flow through the porous national borders to the north (Ethiopia), south
(Tanzania), and east (Somalia).
In 1993, GTZ-Marsabit Development Programme (GTZ-MDP) sponsored a feasibility study
for a proposed abattoir at Isiolo and found that a medium-sized facility could be profitable (Surtech
Consulting Engineers (1993)). The study suggested that a canning facility be part of the complex
and that a government subsidy arrangement be worked out to help facilitate emergency offtake. The
study also suggested that livestock producers and traders from the region be allowed to buy shares
in the project to ensure a regular supply of slaughter stock. A holding company, Frontier Meat
Products was registered to undertake the project about three years ago but there has been no further
progress.
J

These findings suggests significant risk exists for those considering investing in high-volume
slaughter and distribution facilities in the study area (e.g., KMC has closed and another plant has
failed to materialize). A major source of this risk is the inability to ensure adequate supplies to
operate the facilities efficiently. Iffirms are unable to manage slaughter inventories effectively, then
costs (risks) will continue to be high and will discourage investment in these types of facilities.
Fortunately, small-scale slaughter facilities in and around Nairobi -although with no canning
capacity-have recently sprung up to meet Nairobi's growing demand for meat. Aside from public
subsidies, the most likely stimuli to private investment in expanding the distribution and processing
capacity of the livestock marketing channel are the provision of timely and accurate market
information, available to both buyers and sellers, and the removal of barriers which hinder the flow
of products. Such reforms would facilitate the effective supply management necessary to operate
commercially viable meat processing facilities.
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Price Patterns and Market Integration
One of the core tools of markets analysis is market integration testing using price series.
Advances in time series econometrics have spawned much renewed interest and advances in market
integration testing methods in recent years (Barrett 1996, Fackler and Goodwin 1999, Li and Barrett
1999). To the best of our knowledge, no one has yet applied contemporary methods to east African
livestock markets. Fafchamps and Gavian (1997) used one such method - the parity bounds model
- to study spatial livestock market integration in Niger, and that study represents the current stateof-the-art in the study of African livestock market integration.
Our initial results using high-frequency (daily) data from Marsabit, Moyale, and Nairobi
collected by GTZ-MDP indicates that price and basis risk (price differentials between market
locations), as represented by coefficients of variation, are very high (Barrett et al. 1998). This
suggests prices in spatially separated locations along the transect may not be well integrated. The
consequences of loosely integrated markets or segmented markets are typically increased price risk
and allocative inefficiency since local shocks are not smoothed by the aggregate market. Fafchamps
(1998) also suggests that if markets are not spatially integrated that wealthy persons will " ... take
speculative positions during droughts, thereby compounding pasture degradation." Thus, the
question of whether spatial markets in the study area are integrated needs to be addressed at the
outset of our study.
A related question of particular interest to us is the decomposition of the price risk faced by
pastoralists into distinct components-local price risk related to the dispersion of prices within a
periodic market on a given day, basis risk (i.e., variability in price differences between locations),
and terminal market price risk. The appropriate intervention, if any, to reduce the tremendous price
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variability evident in northern Kenyan livestock markets depends fundamentally on the source of
that risk. We hope to address this issue directly in the context of this project.
The Environmental, Infrastructural, and Institutional Context
for Livestock Marketing
Choices made by market participants are conditioned by the context in which they make
decisions.

Environmental conditions-e.g., rainfall, forage availability-affect livestock

productivity and therefore animals' value.

Infrastructural conditions relating to transport,

communications, holding grounds, etc. affect the costs borne by pastoralists and traders in moving
animals from pasture to terminal markets and slaughterhouses. Marketing behaviors at all levels in
the channel are also influenced by institutional conditions surrounding the mechanisms by which
parties to an exchange obtain information and arrive at a price, by which contracts are enforced, by
J

which property rights are protected and physical security ensured, and by which animal disease is
prevented or controlled. Governments and NGOs often have some ability to influence these contexts
and thereby to influence the structure, conduct, and performance of the livestock marketing channel.
This section of the paper focuses on these issues.
Drought and Livestock Cycles, and Famine
While often overlooked in economic studies, environmental conditions play an important role
in livestock marketing in east Africa. Since a primary role of livestock is as a productive asset
generating milk and calves (to a lesser extent blood, manure, and transport or traction power), and
since animal productivity has a strong, positive relation to the condition of the range ecology in
pastoral systems, environmental conditions necessarily affect demand for and supply and prices of
livestock.

Moreover, environmental conditions can affect marketing operations, particularly
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transport and disease control, that affect the costs and therefore the behavior of market
intermediaries.
The level ofrainfall is extremely variable in East Africa (Coppock (1994) and Bille (1983)).
For example, rainfall in Marsabit, Kenya was 1443.8 mm in 1997 but only 320.1 mm in 1996. The
coefficient of variation (CV) for rainfall at Moyale between 1991 and 1997 was 242% (Kenya
Meteorological Department).15 Rainfall also appears to be closely linked with elevation. For
ex amp Ie, Coppock (1994) reports that annual rainfall in southern Ethiopia increases by about 64 mm
for every 100 m in elevation. Variations in rainfall also need to be captured at daily scales, since
monthly and annual figures often mask climatic risks stemming from very uneven daily distribution
patterns (i.e. , rain events may be concentrated in only a few days of the month).
The connection between rainfall levels and the flow of livestock to markets in the study area
J

as well as all SATA is critical since pastoralists tend to build herds during wet years and drastically
deplete their herds during periods of drought (Konczacki (1978); Sandford (1983); Livingstone
(1991); Little (1992); Franke (1982); Toulmin (1994); Coppock (1994); Fafchamps, Udry, and
Czukas (1998)).

During dry periods, animal productivity falls, so the value of livestock to

pastoralists falls and the need for cash with which to purchase grain (a cheaper source of essential
kilocalories and macronutrients than meat) increases, fuelling regular, sharp increases in livestock
supply. This shift often outstrips the marketing and processing capacity in the system, leading to
disorderly marketing and large abso lute price declines (Konczacki (1978); Nj iru (1983); Livingstone
(1986); Little (1992); Holtzman and Kulibaba (1994); Holtzman and Kulibaba (1994); and

'SCoppock (1994) points out that 50 to 60 years of data are probably required to detennine accurate rainfall
patterns. Consequently, our for Moyale need to be interpreted with some caution. For example, Coppock's (1994) CV
for rainfall at Moyale between 1980-89 was about 52%
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Fafchamps and Gavian (1997)).1 6 Furthermore, the increase in demand for basic grains during dry
periods often occurs when grain stores are low and/or in dry years of poor grain yields, leading to
relatively rapid inflation in grain prices and, combined with falling prices for livestock, potentially
disastrous swings in the terms of trade against pastoralists (Swinton (1988); Njiru (1983); Little
(1992); Hotlzman and Kulibaba (1994); Toulmin (1994); and Fafchamps and Gavian (1997)).
Livestock/grain terms of trade are thus a crucial indicator of pastoralist food security in the region
(Little 1996).
Livestock cycles, defmed as systematic rises and falls in livestock numbers over a period of
years, are common throughout the world (e.g., Rosen, Murphy, and Scheinkman (1994)).17
However, the consequences of livestock production cycles in the developing world, especially
SATA, are more severe than in the developed world because these cycles are often associated with
J

drought and famine (Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado (1988); Sen (1981); Webb, von Braun, and
Yohannes (1992); and Coppock (1994)) and because livestock systems rely more heavily on
extensive grazing than on feedlot operations, so animal productivity is more closely tied to climatic
and ecological shocks than in industrial livestock systems.
There is a long history of livestock cycles in Africa characterized by" ... cycles of drought,
range degradation, destocking of animals, range recovery, and restocking of animals, followed by

16While there is agreement that the short-run effect of drought is to reduce prices by increasing offtake (e.g.,
Doran, Low, and Kemp (1979) ; and Sandford (1983)), the longer run effects of successive years oflow rainfall appear
to bring generate a different outcome. For example, Fafchamps and Gavian (pp. 271-2 (1997)) report that the effect
of a single shock in rainfall is that " ... good rains raise prices in the fIrst year but depress them later; bad rains have the
opposite effect." This suggests that more (less) animals are held for breeding and grazing initially when adequate
(inadequate) moisture is available which leads to increased (decreased) beef production in subsequent years.

17It is not unusual for livestock producers to build herds in the face of rising prices in the course of a normal
cycle. For example, the number of females in the U. S. cattle herd rose sharply in the early 1990s even as cattle prices
rose (Anderson, Robb, and Mintert (1997)). But, the U. S. cattle cycle is driven mostly by prices and biological lags
in supply response while African cycles appear to be driven primarily by drought (Coppock (1994)).
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a new cycle of drought and recovery" (Fafchamps 1998). Losses during periods of drought can be
extremely large on a relative basis. For example, Little (1992) reports that herders in some locations
of north em Kenya lost as much as 70% of their herd during the drought of 1984. Livingstone (1986)
reports similar large losses in Kenya during the drought of 1961-62.
Pastoralists have often been viewed as somewhat peculiar in that some researchers believe
that livestock are used by pastoralists as their principal store of wealth rather than as incomegenerating capital (Doran, Low, and Kemp (1979); Coppock (1992); and Coppock (1994)).
However, the peculiarity may be in the fact that income from livestock assets in pastoral Africa is
in the form of products produced from the livestock themselves rather than in cash obtained from
the sale of livestock. If so, economic theory suggests that a capital asset will be held until its income
generating value falls below its salvage value. Consequently, pastoralists may hold livestock even
J

in the face of rapidly declining prices if the value of livestock products exceeds what the animals
could be sold for. This complicates the study of pastoralists' supply response since their actions are
tied not only to traditional market risk in the form of variable prices, but are also driven by their
response to climatic environment and the motivations for holding livestock rather than selling them.
Additional considerations also include the minimal investment and asset options to livestock that
characterize many rangeland areas of East Africa.
Fafchamps (1998) argues there is considerable evidence that livestock cycles in SATA have
as their root cause overgrazing of available pasture (e.g., Doran, Low and Kemp (1979); Sanford
(1983), Livingstone (1986, 1991), Jarvis (1993), Swift (1986), Cossins and Upton (1988), and Oba
and Lusingi (1987)). Fafchamps (1998) argues further that even though livestock production cycles
are usually triggered by two consecutive years of low rainfall after a period increasing livestock
numbers, production cycles in SATA " ... [fundamentally] result from the accumulation of animals
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beyond the carrying capacity of the range.,,1 8 The amplitude of livestock production cycles, and
consequently the severity of the resulting circumstances for pastoralists, also appears to increase
where there is extensive grazing on common pasture such as is common in SATA (Livingstone
(1986); Sandford (1983); and Fafchamps (1998)). The effect that stocking rates-as opposed to
strictly climatic events-has on herd welfare and range productivity will be greatest in higher, more
stable rainfall areas of our study region, than in the lower, less stable (,disequilibrium') rainfall zones
where productivity is mainly driven by climatic events (see Scoones 1995). Nonetheless, policies
designed to decrease pastoralists' risk throughout the study region need to account for the joint
nature of stocking, household, and common property decisions. For example, programs designed
to improve marketing infrastructure without accounting for the potential impact on grazing lands
could exacerbate the problem of overgrazing (Fafchamps (1998)).19
J

Since overgrazing is often viewed as the root of many of the economic problems faced by
pastoralists, much of the literature suggests government interventions designed to increase the
percentage of animals marketed (offtake) over time. Consequently, it is not surprising that the issues
of livestock supply response and livestock prices relating to the effects of drought seem to dominate
the economic literature allotted to livestock markets in both East and West SATA.
Physical Infrastructural Impediments to Livestock Marketing
Climate is not the only source of risk in east African livestock systems. Livestock marketing
must also overcome a variety of physical infrastructural shortcomings that impede the physical flow

18Pafchamps indicates this is supported by work completed by Sanford (1983), Turton (1977), and de Leeuw
and Tothill (1990).
19If infrastructure is improved but rangelands are not, it could lead to even more intense overgrazing in the areas
around market locations.
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of animals, creating de facto barriers to domestic trade. The most important physical infrastructural
weaknesses for the livestock marketing system in the region relate to transport and holding facilities.
Livestock are either trucked or trekked across open country when moved to market. The road
network in northern Kenya is in poor condition, especially in the wake of the El Niiio floods of early
1998. In the absence of all-weather tarmac or gravel roads, vehicles move more slowly, are more
vulnerable to attack by bandits/o and incur substantially more (and more expensive) maintenance
costs. One result is that fewer traders are willing to make the trip. Many communities complain of
insufficient access to traders who might purchase their livestock. Drought preparedness projects
have therefore occasionally subsidized trader transport costs in order to get them to make buying
trips to smaller areas (De Laat 1998). Njiru (pA08, (1983)) reports that Kenyan " ... traders are
never sure that when they take their animals to a market they will find a buyer. The distances
J

involved are usually so high that when the costs of trucking or trekking have been incurred the trader
has to sell the animals at any price. It would not be profitable for them to return the animals."
Moreover, when they arrive at market centers they may find that grazing and water are scarce and
expensive to purchase.
This highlights a related problem of "hold-ups." Economic contract theory suggests that
when one party to a contract must incur sunk costs prior to its counterparty's own commitment of
funds, the latter can use this to his/her advantage in renegotiating contractual terms, especially if
opting out of the contract forces the first party to also incur sunk exit costs. In effect, exit costs (in
this case, the costs of moving livestock back to pasture from market) render supply considerably
more price inelastic, conferring market power on buyers. Sunk entry costs (the costs of moving

2°Banditry is not an issue in southern Ethiopia, so this comments refers to conditions in northern Kenya
(Mahmud (1999)).
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livestock to market) and pastoralists' recognition of this potential problem to change the sequencing or magnitude of these costs -

and their impotence

lowers marketing volumes (i.e., fewer

contracts) in equilibrium. The relevance is immediate to livestock marketing in a region with
rudimentary infrastructure and, therefore, high sunk transport costs (not to mention physical security
risks, a point to which we tum below). A vicious cycle results. High sunk costs and associated holdup problems reduce marketing volumes, which in tum lower investment in slaughtering capacity,
which makes processor demand price inelastic as marketed volumes increase, leading to price
crashes. Furthermore, reduced marketing volumes depress the returns to investment in infrastructure
that might reduce sunk costs, trapping the system in a vicious cycle of high intermediation costs,
inelastic demand and supply, and considerable price variability.
Another consequence of poor transport infrastructure is that sellers and traders commonly
J

opt for trekking over trucking animals. Data provided by GTZ-MDP indicate an overwhelming
majority (about 8S%) of animals sold in Marsabit in 1996 were trekked from market. Trekking has
high costs, in terms of animal mortality and weight loss, trekker time, greater risk of raiding, and
environmental and social stress along trekking routes. But without better institutional or physical
infrastructure, the cost and availability of motorized transport services precludes more socially
efficient, environmentally friendly, and less risky forms of livestock transport. Transport costs are
unusually high on a relative basis, ranging from IS-80 per cent of the terminal market price in
Nairobi. For example, in Kenya's Isiolo District during 1990, trucking accounted for between SO%
and 800/0 of marketing costs for pastoralists, depending on location, and amounted to about 13% to
18% of the total value of small stock and over 9% of the value of cattle. Total transactions costs for
marketing livestock in the Isiolo District during 1990 were between 20% and 2S% of the livestock's
value (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development, and Marketing (1993)). By contrast,
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trucking costs and total transaction costs in U. S. cattle markets during the same time period
averaged approximately 30/0-4% and 10% of the value of the cattle being sold, respectively (Bailey,
Peterson, and Brorsen (1991)).
Transport infrastructure is not the only important weakness. Other than at the closed KMC
facilities and at one other slaughter facility in Nairobi, there are no feeding facilities in the Nairobi
area for livestock awaiting slaughter. Abattoir sites double as market sites for live animals, and are
also considered as quarantine sites. This means that livestock delivered to these sites can not be
legally moved out again. 21 This effectively eliminates other market alternatives once livestock arrive
on site. Traders selling cattle at Dagoretti,just outside of Nairobi, routinely face this problem. 22 The
market space is rather small and there are no feeding facilities. Consequently, when daily livestock
deliveries exceed daily slaughter capacity sellers are placed in a weak bargaining position since the
J

livestock cannot easily be moved to an alternate market, although traders will occasionally move
their animals to Njeru market, north of the city, when market conditions are unfavorable at
Dagoretti. Add to this constraint the fact that the condition of animals trekked or trucked long
distance degrades rapidly without rest or water (and because of the cooler conditions in Nairobi than
in the lowlands from which most of the livestock originate). Improved holding facilities in the
Nairobi area or in areas outside of Nairobi may help Nairobi's livestock markets to be more efficient
(Chabari (1998)).

Institutional Barriers: Market Information,
Contracts, Security, and Animal Disease Control

21 Especially if they originated or mixed with livestock from north of Nairobi because the whole of northern
Kenya is under permanent quarantine for Contagious Pleura-pneumonia (CBPP).
22Dagoretti is used as an example here. Since Dagoretti lies to the south of Nairobi other markets like Nejru
and Kariobangi are more important for northern Kenyan livestock. There are no holding facilities at Kariobangi,
Nairobi 's main small stock market.
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Efficient arbitrage depends fundamentally on pastoralists and/or traders having access to
reliable information on market conditions, especially prices, prevailing at multiple locations. There
is evidence that market information reduces market risk. 23 The efficiency of market information in
the study area-most notably, as manifest in the efficiency of price transmission between markets
-has not be quantified. For several years, GTZ-MDP funded the collection, processing, and
dissemination of market information (of prices, animal conditions, etc. for a variety of species) in
the study area. The dissemination process undertaken by GTZ-MDP was not extremely intensive
and was limited to posting information notices at Marsabit, Moyale, Korr, and Kalacha, yet the
information was used extensively, especially by traders. Market information was also broadcast
weekly on the GTZ-MDP and National Radio networks in the Rendille and Boran languages. The
radio broadcasts were popular but had limited impact because of the limited number of radios among
the pastoral community (Chabari (1999)). However, by the end ofGTZ-MDP's sponsorship period,
the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation was willing to continue broadcasting market information
without charge due to the high demand for the information from people in the region. The county
council and traders in Moyale agreed to support the dissemination of market information from
Nairobi by agreeing to fund the service with Ksh. 5.00 for each head of cattle sold in Moyale. There
is also some evidence to suggest more movement of livestock from traditionally low-priced areas
to high priced ones occurred after the introduction of GTZ-MDP's market information program.
Price broadcasting is one means of dissemination of market information. Another occurs at
a much more local level-the means of price formation and discovery within a particular market.
Livestock transactions take many forms across the study area. Some places-e.g., Marigat, Suguta

23Por example, Smyth (1973) ; Stein (1992); and Bailey and Brorsen (1998) suggest that market information
reduces market price variability.
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Mannar (Samburu), Moyale- have well established livestock auctions that ensure all participants
have equal infonnation about current pricing conditions. In other places, traders engage in one-onone negotiation with sellers, which often confers a significant infonnational advantage on the trader
who has been actively dealing with relatively more parties. If possible, it would be fruitful to
analyze transactional data from different types of markets to see whether price dispersion (i.e., price
risk) is less (as one would expect) in markets based on auctions. GTZ-MDP has sponsored livestock
auctions in several remote locations and found that prices paid for livestock during the auctions were
dramatically higher than prior to the auction (Chabari (1998)).
Overall, the limited coverage of auctions or other forums for public price fonnation and
discovery, as well as of market infonnation broadcasting or dissemination services suggests that
inefficiencies may continue to exist in the study area because accurate market infonnation is not
J

readily available to buyers and sellers. These are services that can be provided at relatively low cost
by local governments, producer cooperatives, or NGOs, if central government is unwilling to invest
in these improvements in institutional infrastructure.
Weak public infonnation systems and the absence of a credible means to enforce spot market
livestock contracts through the legal system contribute to the importance of infonnal networks
among traders. As noted earlier, these networks often are defmed by ethnicity, clan, or some other
social affinity that encourages cooperation among distant parties otherwise vulnerable to "hold-up"
problems of the sort described earlier, and enables individuals to monitor each other effectively and
to enforce contracts extrajudicially through third parties. These networks create important barriers
to entry for outsiders wishing to break into the marketing channel, but within the networks costs of
infonnation and enforcement are substantially reduced.
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Physical insecurity-the risk ofbanditry and violence-compounds the problems created by
weak physical infrastructure and high market transaction costs. Livestock raiding-long an activity
of young men and a means for settling scores with neighboring clans and ethnic groups-is itself
increasingly fuelled by the prospective commercialization of livestock (Fleischer 1998). Yet, because
it often develops hand-in-hand with violent banditry fuelled by ubiquitous automatic weaponry in
the rangelands, raiding further degrades infrastructure and fuels the costs and risks of market
intermediation, igniting a vicious cycle of physical and economic insecurity that further immiserizes
pastoralists.

Both pastoralists and traders are increasingly scared to engage in long distance

transactions, thereby dampening intermarket arbitrage and the efficiency of marketing channels in
transmitting signals of relative scarcity or surplus among spatially distinct consumers and producers.
Pastoralists' own risk declarations reveal that the poor, defined as those pastoralists with small herds,
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perceive greater risk of raiding-related violence than do the wealthy (Smith et al. 1999). Moreover,
conflict induces pastoralists to settle around towns for security, thereby reducing their access to some
of the best pasture and seasonal water sources, hampering animal productivity and hence prices, and
contributing to the degradation of the range ecology around towns (Fleischer 1998).
The private and public institutional apparatus in place to address animal health issues affects
the marketing channel in several ways. First, the distribution of medicines, dips, etc. from Nairobi
to the northern rangelands covers one half of a lorry's roundtrip, leaving the backhaulleg free for
the transport of animals. Second, animal health affects animal productivity, thereby influencing
pastoralist supply of livestock to the marketing channel and the prices those animals fetch. Third,
animal disease control measures create frictions in the marketing system by adding to costs or
interrupting the flow of animals between spatially distinct markets.
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Preventive animal disease control through vaccination programs, cattle dips, etc. seems to
be on the decline with the sharp reduction of government-sponsored animal health programs in most
of our study area, although community-based paraveterinary programs are providing services in
some areas previously underserved by public schemes (Gathuma and Mutiga 1997). Low-incomes
and low population densities make private provision of preventive veterinary care unprofitable in
most of the east African rangelands, hence the dearth of private animal health services.
Partly as a consequence of the decline ofpreventive animal health care in the region, animal
health measures have come to rely more on curative treatment. For the marketing channel, this
implies a tilt away from animal health certification and toward quarantines within and between
countries have become central to preventing animal disease epidemics. There are animal health
related certification requirements in place for some diseases and districts.

Presently, Kenya
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maintains such a permanent quarantine in northern Kenya against contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia (CBPP), requiring certification through blood testing of each animal and
movement of cleared animals by vehicle to slaughterhouses so as to minimize the risk of
transmission ofCBPP to the central highlands commercial herds. Such clearance procedures serve
as a specific tax per animal, adding to marketing costs. Such restrictions are less disruptive to the
marketing channel than absolute quarantines, in which no intermarket passage of animals is
permitted, as occurs during food and mouth disease (FMD) or rinderpest outbreaks in the region.
Quarantines have been commonplace for some time. For example, Mbogoh (1997) reports that
livestock restrictions on movement between the northern Kenyan ASAL and adjoining Laikipia and
Meru Districts were imposed 60 times during the period 1984-88.
The distinction between health certification and quarantine policies can perhaps be
understood through the application of basic trade theory from economics. Certification and testing
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programs are de facto tariffs that slow animal movement and add to terminal market livestock prices.
Quarantines, on the other hand, are de facto binding quotas, in that in practice they forbid the exit
of animals from an outbreak region, thereby segmenting markets, interrupting the flow of animals
through the (cross-border) marketing channel and contributing to price variability. The magnitude
of the effects of quarantine on prices is as yet unknown in the region. We do know, however, that
in some parts of northern Kenya such bans result in excessive local stocking rates and large-scale
losses when there are even moderate perturbations in rainfall (Little 1992). If the effects of
quarantines are large throughout the region, this might suggest that preventive animal health care
expenditures that successfully reduce the frequency of recourse to quarantines would be socially
optimal to the present approach to animal disease control. This is a hypothesis to be explored. In
general, economic theory is clear in its demonstration of the greater efficiency of tariffs, as compared
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to quotas. Moreover, when certification and testing protocols convey valuable information to
consumers as to product quality (e.g., food safety) - a feature especially important when one
considers export marketability of animal products - these barriers to trade can in fact be welfare
enhancing even though they add to marketing costs (Thilmany and Barrett 1997).
Toward Risk-Reducing Interventions: Preliminary
Research Needs
The considerable price risk and costs observed in livestock marketing in east Africa therefore
arise naturally from the conjuncture of several factors: pastoralists' multiple objectives in livestock
holding, a legacy of limited private marketing capacity, considerable environmental variation,
rudimentary physical infrastructure, and weak rural institutions for market information
dissemination, price formation and contract enforcement, assurance of physical security, and
preventive animal health services. The effect of the factors appears in the form of high transactions
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costs to livestock marketing, significant hold-up problems, inelastic demand and supply that lead to
considerable price variability, and low average livestock prices received by pastoralists. The
weaknesses of the marketing system impose tremendous direct and indirect costs on east African
pastoralists, the region's poorest subpopulation.
So what might be done to ameliorate the situation? The preceding analysis points to many
candidate points for intervention by local or national governments or NGOs. But absent a basic
foundation of research on the core behavioral and contextual elements of the livestock marketing
system of the area, recommendations cannot proceed on more than a speculative basis. Despite the
importance of pastoralist livestock production and marketing to the economies of East
Africa-perhaps especially in the arid and semi-arid lands such as those of our project study area
in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia-the available literature on the subject of livestock
j

marketing is thin. And as best as we can tell, there is no published work-injoumals, government,
or donor pUblications--combining reliable data series with reasonably current analytical methods.
In sum, our empirical understanding of livestock marketing systems in the east African ASAL is

extraordinarily limited.
The current proj ect therefore enj oys an opportunity to contribute substantively to the advance
of practical knowledge about livestock marketing in the region. We see five interrelated topics in
need of exploration: (i) patterns of spatial and intertemporal price transmission and market
integration to establish the efficiency of existing marketing channels, (ii) pastoralist marketing
behavioral patterns (e.g., response to changes in livestock price distributions, to food aid deliveries,
to climate forecasts, etc.), (iii) the effects of intra- and inter-household livestock rights and
exchanges on animal sales, (iv) the relationship between animal disease control (particularly through
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quarantines), climate, and marketing dynamics, and (v) the structure, conduct, and performance of
the livestock marketing channel.
The project needs longitudinal analysis of marketing patterns. Livestock are long-lived
assets and the multiple roles they play in the pastoral economy try ii using dynamic stochastic
programming methods, following Behrman and Foster. Multiple round household surveys slated
to begin in late 1999 should be able to generate sufficient seasonal and interannual variation to
enable estimation of these behavioral parameters and thereby to gain a better capacity to predict how
pastoralist livestock sales will respond to changes induced by policy reforms or climatic, economic
or sociopolitical shocks. Locations for sampling will be selected to account for differences in spatial
access to markets, herd compositions, ethnicity, and climatic variability in the study region.
We will pursue (iv) above by fielding trader surveys, looking at transport patterns, financing
J

and security requirements, the role of social networks in marketing channels, the availability of
reliable spot market information on a timely basis, the differences between auctions, coops,
coordinated/subsidized buying interventions (e.g., DPIRP). Existence and role of mobility and
entry/exit barriers (Barrett 1997).
We are interested in determining the relative risk associated with local and central markets
since policy remedies are quite different for different types of markets. For example, if the source
of market risk is primarily from central markets then external shocks such as exchange rate risk,
income shocks, or infrastructure bottlenecks may be the principal reason for price variability in
livestock markets. If the primary source of risk is in local markets, then improvements in local
market infrastructure and information may help to reduce market risk. We will also examine the
impact of quarantines on livestock markets to determine the costs of quarantines and consequently
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the implicit benefits associated with programs designed to control or eradicate livestock diseases in
the study area.
Part of our analysis will be to estimate the costs of livestock quarantines. This will be done
by comparing relative prices at different market locations just preceding, during, and immediately
following livestock quarantines. This will provide an estimate of the loss in revenue per animal in
the quarantined areas and also the increased cost of meat in Nairobi. The purpose of this part of the
analysis is to estimate the level of investment governments should make in herd health and education
programs.
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